Samsung Galaxy Back-door¶

This page contains a technical description of the back-door found in Samsung Galaxy devices.
For a general description of the issue, please refer to the following statement:

This back-door is present in most proprietary Android systems running on the affected Samsung Galaxy devices, including the ones that are shipped with the devices. However, when Replicant is installed on the device, this back-door is not effective: Replicant does not cooperate with back-doors.

Abstract¶

Samsung Galaxy devices running proprietary Android versions come with a back-door that gives remote access to the data stored on the device.
In particular, the proprietary software that is in charge of handling the communications with the modem, using the Samsung IPC protocol, implements a class of requests known as RFS commands, that allows the modem to perform remote I/O operations on the phone's storage.

Disclaimer: We are not security researchers and cannot establish the absolute certainty that the incriminated software actually contains the back-door we describe. However, everything apparently points in that direction and we believe the information at our disposal is relevant enough to constitute a solid-enough basis for us to issue a statement about this presumed back-door. If you have any indication that would prove our statement wrong, do not hesitate contacting us.

Analysis¶

The following analysis was conducted using the libsec-ril.so binary file (the incriminated proprietary software) as extracted from the CyanogenMod 10.1.3 system zip for the Galaxy S 3 (I9300), from location system/lib/libsec-ril.so.

The developers involved in the present analysis did not ever agree to any sort of End User License Agreement that explicitly prohibited the reverse engineering and decompiling operations of the incriminated binary. The reverse engineering operations that lead to these findings originally took place during the development of Samsung-RIL, the free software replacement for the incriminated program. Hence, we believe these operations were conducted for the sole purpose of interoperability and not with the intent of creating a competing product. As the involved developers were based in Europe, we believe the legality of these operations is granted by article 6 of the 1991 EU Computer Programs Directive.

As a first approach, using the strings tool against the incriminated program reveals numerous suspicious command names that appear to be Samsung IPC protocol definitions:

IPC_RFS_READ_FILE
IPC_RFS_WRITE_FILE
IPC_RFS_LSEEK_FILE
IPC_RFS_CLOSE_FILE
IPC_RFS_PUT_FILE
IPC_RFS_GET_FILE
IPC_RFS_RENAME_FILE
IPC_RFS_GET_FILE_INFO
IPC_RFS_UNLINK_FILE
IPC_RFS_MAKE_DIR
IPC_RFS_REMOVE_DIR
IPC_RFS_OPEN_DIR
IPC_RFS_READ_DIR
IPC_RFS_CLOSE_DIR
IPC_RFS_OPEN_FILE
IPC_RFS_FTRUNCATE_FILE
IPC_RFS_GET_HANDLE_INFO
IPC_RFS_CREATE_FILE

The names of these commands make it obvious that they let the modem perform I/O operations.

The strings utility also reveals matching function names that seem to implement the handling of these commands:

RxRFS_GetFile
RxRFS_CreateFile
RxRFS_ReadDirectory
RxRFS_OpenDirectory
RxRFS_RenameFile
RxRFS_Default
RxRFS_OpenFile
RxRFS_ReadFile
RxRFS_FtruncateFile
RxRFS_WriteFile
RxRFS_GetFileInfoByHandle
RxRFS_GetFileInfo
RxRFS_PutFile
RxRFS_LseekFile
RxRFS_CloseFile
RxRFS_DeleteFile
RxRFS_MakeDirectory
RxRFS_CloseDirectory
RxRFS_RemoveDirectory
TxRFS_CfrmCreateFile
TxRFS_CfrmPutFile
TxRFS_CfrmOpenDirectory
TxRFS_CfrmGetFileInfo
TxRFS_CfrmReadDirectory
TxRFS_CfrmRenameFile
TxRFS_CfrmCloseFile
TxRFS_CfrmFtruncateFile
TxRFS_CfrmGetFileInfoByHandle
TxRFS_CfrmDeleteFile
TxRFS_CfrmCloseDirectory
TxRFS_CfrmRemoveDirectory
TxRFS_CfrmMakeDirectory
TxRFS_CfrmGetFile
TxRFS_CfrmReadFile
TxRFS_CfrmWriteFile
TxRFS_CfrmLseekFile
TxRFS_CfrmOpenFile

Notes¶

Our free software replacement for the incriminated binary is Samsung-RIL which relies on libsamsung-ipc and it is used in Replicant.

The affected devices have modems that use the Samsung IPC protocol, mostly Intel XMM6160 and Intel XMM6260 modems. Note that despite this back-door, the devices using these modems are most likely to have good modem isolation, compared to other devices using Qualcomm platforms. Bear in mind that this back-door is implemented in software and can easily be removed by installing a free replacement for the incriminated software, for instance by installing Replicant. Hence, we don't consider the incriminated devices as bad targets for Replicant because of this back-door.